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Full text of "Injunction. Labels. Use of Private Name and Likeness. Atkinson v. John E. Doherty & Co., 80 N. W. 285 (Mich.)"

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Renihan v. Wright, 125 Ind. 536, and that the surviving husband or wife, as 
the case may be, controls this right rather than the next of kin. Weld v. 
Walker, 130 Mass. 422; Durell v. Hayward, 9 Gray (Mass.) 248; Larson v. 
Chase, 47 Minn. 307; Burney v. Children's Hospital, 169 Mass. 57, 47 N. E. 

Though it is well established that after a burial, with the free consent 
of the person having the right to control the same, such person is estopped 
from removing the remains. Fox v. Cordon, 16 Phila. (Pa.) 185; Peters v. 
Peters, 43 N. J. Eq. 140; Thompson v. Deeds, 93 Iowa 228. Yet if the remains 
have been buried without such free consent, a court of equity may permit 
such person to remove them. Weld v. Walker, 130 Mass. 422; Hackett v. 
Hackett, 18 R. I. 155, 26 Atl. 42. 

Homestead Lien — Borrowed Money — Contract — Indebtedness In- 
curred After Homestead Right Attaches — Johnson County Savings 
Bank v. Carroll, 80 N. W. 683 (Iowa). — Where a creditor loans money on 
security, which is thereafter lost, he is not entitled to a lien on the homestead 
although the money loaned was used to pay part of the purchase price. 

Robinson, C. J., dissenting on the ground that same gives to the defend- 
ant property which he never paid for, and holds it exempt from liability for 
the purchase price actually paid by another. 

In Eysier v. Hatheway, 50 111. 521, and Mitchell v. McCormick, 50 Pac. 216, 
it was held that, in order to raise a lien on the homestead, it is not enough 
to show that the borrowed money was used to pay for the homestead, but 
it must also appear that it was a part of the contract that this should be 

In Williams v. Jones, 100 111. 362, it was held that, although there be a 
waiver of the vendor's lien by taking other security for purchase money 
furnished, the holder of the indebtedness will not thereby lose the protec- 
tion of the statute which provides that a homestead is not exempt from sale 
for a debt or liability incurred for the purchase or improvement thereof. 

In Christy v. Dyer, 14 Iowa 438, it was held that a debt for the purchase 
money of premises occupied by the debtor as a homestead, is not a debt 
arising after the purchase of such homestead; and the homestead may, there- 
fore, be subjected to the satisfaction of same. 

Injunction — Labels — Use of Private Name and Likeness — Atkin- 
son v. John E. Doherty & Co., 80 N. W. 285 (Mich.). — Equity will not 
restrain the use of the name and likeness of a deceased person as a label to 
be used in the sale of cigars named after him, though he may not have been 
a public character, so long as it does not amount to a libel. 

This case has aroused wide-spread comment throughout the country, as 
deciding that there is no law in Michigan against bad taste, and involves a 
discussion of the law in regard to the so-called "right to privacy." How 
much property right has a person in his name and portrait? 

In Schuyler v. Curtis, 19 N. Y. Sup. 264, 64 Hun. 594, the Supreme Court 
held that a preliminary injunction would be at the instance of the relatives 
of a deceased woman to prevent her statue from being exhibited at the 
World's Fair, and designated "The Typical Philanthropist." The case was 
afterwards heard and a decree entered in accordance with the prayer of the 
bill. Schuyler v. Curtis (Sup. 124 N. Y. Sup. 509). This decision was squarely 
in conflict with the doctrine laid down in present case, but was reversed by 
the Court of Appeals in 1895. See 42 N. E. 22, Gray, J., dissenting, the 
opinion holding that "a woman's right of privacy, in so far as it includes the 
right to prevent the public from making pictures and statues of her, does 
not survive her, so that it can be enforced by her relatives." In Marks v. 
Jaffa, 26 N. Y. Sup. 908, publication of portrait was enjoined apparently 
on the strength of Schuyler v. Curtis, not then reversed. 


Corliss v. Walker, 31 Lawy. Rep. Ann. 283, and note (S. C. 57 Fed. 434, 
and 64 Fed. 280), denied an injunction to restrain the publication of a biog- 
raphy of the great inventor, but granted it to restrain the publication of his 
portrait. Subsequently this injunction was dissolved, on the ground that the 
deceased was a public character, not a private individual. In the case under 
discussion the court in commenting on the Corliss case questions the wis- 
dom of the distinction, and says: "We are loath to believe that the man 
who makes himself useful to mankind surrenders any right of privacy 

In Murray v. Engraving Co., 28 N. Y. Sup. 271, it was held that a father 
could not prevent the unauthorized publication of his child's photograph, 
for the law takes no cognizance of a sentimental injury independent of a 
wrong to person or property. 

There are many authorities to the effect that a private individual has a 
right to be protected in the representation of his portrait in any form, and 
that this is a property as well as a personal right. Cf. Gee v. Pritchard, 2 
Swanst. 402; Folsom v. Marsh, 2 Story 100, Fed. Cas. No. 4901; Tipping v. 
Clarke, 2 Hare 383, 393; Prince Albert v. Strange, 1 Mach and G. 25. But the 
court in the present case decides that the alleged right to privacy is not 
under this particular state of facts a property right, and that so long as the 
publication of the portrait does not amount to a libel, a court of equity will 
not protect the relatives of the deceased against a mere injury to their feel- 
ings, although a violation of the canons of good taste. "The law," says the 
court, "does not discriminate between persons who are sensitive and those 
who are not." 

Insolvent Corporations — Secret Preference of Creditors — 
United States Rubber Co. et al. v. American Oak Leather Co., 96 Fed. 
841. — Where a corporation that is about to fail, in order to gain time and 
borrow money, makes an arrangement with some of its creditors whereby 
they are to be put in charge of the concern and be given judgment notes 
covering what is due them and thereby are to prevent preferences to other 
creditors, such an arrangement is a fraud in fact on the general creditors. 

Courts have recognized the justice of allowing embarrassed concerns to 
tide over difficulties by using their property in any way they may see fit. 
Preston v. Spaulding, 125 111. 20; White v. Cotshausen, 129 U. S. 329. But 
they have further recognized that one cannot convey all his property and 
stop doing business. Kelloy v. Richardson, 19 Fed. 70, 72. It then becomes 
a question of what was the intention of the insolvent concern in entering 
into obligations like those in the present case. How close a question this 
often is, is well illustrated by the case before us. We see how frequently 
the judicial mind may differ on this point, and in view of the large interests 
that may be concerned in such case, how important it is that a transaction 
should be considered as actually fraudulent only on the strongest proof or 
actual knowledge. Street v. Bank, 147 U. S. 36. 

Insurance— Agent— Authority — Notice — Policy — Endorsement 
—Warranty — Northrup et al. v. Piza, 60 N. Y. Supp. 363. — A fire insur- 
ance policy was issued by general agents and attorneys of a fire insurance 
company on recommendation of a firm of fire insurance brokers, said policy 
containing material warranty on the part of the insured. Subsequently an 
addition was made to the policy in which no mention was made of the war- 
ranty. Held, that a broker having only authority to solicit risks, recommend 
same, and receive premiums (these services being paid for by commissions), 
is not an agent of the insuring company, and hence notice to him is not 
notice to the company. Also that attachment of said endorsement, see 
supra, did not abrogate original warranty clause.